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PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE
RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED COMPETENT
Maurice S. Fisher, Jr. *
I. CREATION OF THE RIGHT OF PSYCHIATRIC SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF COMPETENCY
In 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the right of a
competent individual to control his or her own medical treatment when it
noted that competent persons have a fundamental liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment.' In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, the Supreme Court found that where the "prior expressed wishes"
of an incapacitated patient can be determined by clear and convincing
evidence, those wishes should be honored.2 Implicit in this decision is the
right of a patient to provide explicit instructions concerning his or her future
medical care during a period of incapacity. The Supreme Court has since
reaffirmed its implication in Cruzan, finding that "the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment [is] so rooted in our history, tradition, and
practice as to require special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."
3
With Cruzan laying the groundwork for the concept of an advance health
care directive 4, Congress passed the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A., University of Virginia, May 2005. The author thanks his father, Maurice S.
Fisher, Sr., Ph.D., ACSW, LCSW, for inspiring this note through his work with, and
indefatigable advocacy for, his clients and the mentally ill. The author also thanks the
editors and staff of the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy for their
dedication and hard work. The author also wishes to thank Allison, for her love and
unbroken patience and his grandfather, William E. Fisher, for everything.
1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
2. Id. at 284.
3. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 n.17 (1997). Though, the
Court here reiterates that for purposes of the Cruzan decision, it only assumed that the
Due Process Clause protects a right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment. Id. at
723.
4. An advance health-care directive is "an individual instruction or power of
attorney for healthcare." UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT OF 1993 § 1, 9 U.L.A. 309
(Supp. 1999) [hereinafter HEALTH-CARE DEcisioNs ACT]. The purpose of an advance
health-care directive is to allow competent individuals the ability to decide and control
their health care in every conceivable situation, including decisions to decline medical
treatment that may result in death. Id at Prefatory Note.
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(PSDA).5 The PSDA essentially requires health care providers to maintain
written policies and procedures in order to provide information to adult
patients regarding their right to accept or refuse medical treatment.6 Medical
providers are also required to document whether or not a patient has
executed an advance directive. Since Cruzan and the enactment of the
PSDA, every state has created the right to execute advance health care
directives in some form. 8  As the use of advance directives became
mainstream, health care professionals and patients began to find and demand
more creative uses for them.
Less than one year after the Cruzan decision, New York recognized that a
person's fundamental right to refuse medical treatment extends equally to
patients who are mentally ill.9 Further, given that the concept of executing
an advance directive is centered on the contemplation of future incapacity,
mental health advocates began to make the logical argument that advance
directives are particularly well suited for mentally ill patients.10 Because
mentally ill patients often experience cyclical periods of competency and
incompetency, advance directives would afford these patients the ability to
better control the course of their treatment.11 Most advance health care
directive statutes allow individuals to make decisions regarding future
mental health care. However, a number of states have enacted separate
statutes authorizing the execution of Psychiatric Advance Directives
(hereinafter "PADs"). 12
All of the jurisdictions that have enacted the right to execute PADs utilize
a similar framework. For instance, most state statutes afford a presumption
of competency for purposes of executing a PAD. However, those of
Louisiana and Indiana do not. The PAD statutes enacted in Louisiana and
Indiana essentially take the position that one is incompetent until proven
otherwise. Because of this stance, it is possible that those most likely to use
PADs (i.e., those that suffer from some form of mental illness) could be
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a(1994).
6. Id. at 1396a(w)(A)(i)(ii). This applies only to medical providers receiving
Medicaid and Medicare payments. Id.
7. Id. at 1396a(w)(B).
8. See HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, supra note 4, at Prefatory Note.
9. In re Rosa M, 155 Misc. 2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
10. Paul S. Applebaum, M.D., Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment, 42
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 983, 983 (1991).
11. Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical
and Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746, 747
(1998).
12. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted Psychiatric
Advance Directive statutes. For a complete survey of the states that have enacted such
statutes see infra notes 108-19.
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deterred from taking full control over their mental health care decisions.
This Note examines the legal framework through which PADs arose, and
advocates that all future PAD statutes fully recognize a presumption of
competency for the execution of a PAD. Section II identifies the
constitutional and legal bases from which the concept of PADs sprang.
Section III then explores the bases for a presumption of competency, both
generally and in the context of PAD statutes, while considering relevant
state interests. Finally, Section IV suggests that in the future, consumers in
all states should have a fully recognized presumption of competency for
purposes of executing a PAD.
II. PROTECTED LIBERTY INTERESTS
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment is a Fundamental Liberty Interest
under the Constitution
The right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment is assumed to be a
fundamental liberty interest afforded to all competent persons by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13  Over the years, the
Supreme Court has developed a framework to determine whether an interest
rises to the level of a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.14  The determining factor is whether the interest is so
fundamental that it is embedded in the history and traditions of the United
States. 5 The Supreme Court, therefore, has never defined in absolute terms
the "liberty" that the Due Process Clause protects.' 6 However, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "liberty" must be broad enough to include, inter
alia, "the right of the individual to . . .engage in any of the common
occupations of life . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . .as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
17
By declining to recognize the right to have physician-assisted suicide, the
Court expounded upon its inquiry regarding whether the right to refuse
13. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). In deciding
under what circumstances an incompetent person may refuse lifesaving medical
treatment, the Supreme Court in Cruzan assumed, without deciding, that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. Id.
The Supreme Court still has not explicitly recognized that there is a fundamental liberty
interest in refusing lifesaving medical treatment. See e.g. Washington v. Glucksberg, 512
U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
14. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
15. Id.
16. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
17. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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medical treatment is so fundamental as to require Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process protection. In Cruzan, the Court found that implicit in the
common law requirement of informed consent is the right of a medical
patient to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court explained this right within the framework described
above. 19 The Court noted therein, in discussing the application of Cruzan,
that a physician would effectively be guilty of the common law tort of
battery if a physician forced unwanted medical treatment upon a patient.
2
0
Therefore, it is well within the traditions of this country, both historically
and legally,2 ' to recognize the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment as
an interest that rises to the level of being so fundamental that the
Constitution requires it to be protected.22  This right is not just simply
23inhered in one's personal autonomy.
B. Limitations on the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right to refuse medical treatment as a fundamental right may be
limited to instances where the medical treatment is for lifesaving purposes.
For instance, the Supreme Court has differentiated between the withdrawal
of lifesaving medical treatment and the administration of life-ending medical
treatment.2 4 Further, under certain circumstances, the states have a right to
limit the refusal of psychiatric medication (as opposed to lifesaving
medication), but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
25
restricts a states ability to impose such a limitation. While mental health
patients have a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medication, this
18. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.





24. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Applying a rational basis analysis, the
Court here noted that states have a compelling interest in preserving life, not intentionally
hastening death. Id. at 808-09. Focusing on concepts of causation, the Court found that
withdrawal of life saving medication results in a death that is caused by the underlying
medical condition, whereas administering medical treatment to hasten death intervenes
and deprives the underlying medical condition of actual causation. See id. at 800-02.
25. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that mentally ill state
prisoners could be treated with antipsychotic medication against their will only if they
were found to be severely disabled or dangerous); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485 (1986)
(holding that involuntarily committed patients have a right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic medication, but that this right may subordinate itself to the state of New
York's interest in providing care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves and
who present a danger to themselves or others).
2009
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fight is not absolute. 26  States have a compelling interest in administering
such medication when patients present an imminent danger to themselves or
27others. Nonetheless, due process requires that a determination be made
that the patient is incapable of making his or her own treatment decisions.28
The Supreme Court has even held that an adult can, under certain
circumstances (e.g., where a person who is in some way dangerous), be
involuntarily committed for treatment of a mental health disorder or mental
illness. 2 9  The Court later elaborated, holding that persons may be
involuntarily committed to mental health facilities if they are shown, by a
minimum "clear and convincing evidence" standard, to be dangerous to
either themselves or others. 30 This further illustrates that the right to refuse
medical treatment can be limited in certain contexts. Nonetheless, even
cases that recognize these limitations-including the right to refuse
antipsychotic medications-note that procedural due process requires a
determination to be made that a given patient is incapable of making
decisions concerning his or her medical treatment.
31
C. State Created Liberty Interests
In addition to the liberty interests found in the Due Process Clause, liberty
interests may also be created through state law.3 2 The Federal Constitution
independently protects these state created liberty interests.
33
In Wolff v. McDonnel,34 the Supreme Court found that prison inmates do
not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in receiving credit
26. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495. Note that this case deals with the rights of
involuntarily committed patients.
27. Id. at 496. This is a valid exercise of a State's police power. Id.
28. Id. at 498.
29. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Though the Court did not in
this instance set forth the parameters or procedures for determining when a person can be
committed, it did note that the Constitution does not allow the commitment of a non-
dangerous person without more than the simple fact of mental illness. Id. at 575-76.
30. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
31. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498. This applies where the patient necessarily needs
medication and is currently unable to care for himself.
32. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979). See generally Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnel, 418
U.S. 539 (1974); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
33. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-9.
34. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
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toward an early parole due to good behavior.35 However, the Court did find
that the State of Nebraska had statutorily created this liberty interest. As
such, the prison inmates were afforded the procedural protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that this state created right could not be
36arbitrarily countermanded. That is to say, the State of Nebraska may
withhold an inmate's liberty interest in receiving credits for good behavior if
he or she has misbehaved, but this interest is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
37
Conversely, in Meachum v. Fano,38 the Supreme Court concluded that
state prisoners had neither a constitutionally protected liberty interest, nor a
state created liberty interest, in remaining free from being transferred from
one prison to another of less than favorable conditions. 39  Under these
circumstances, Massachusetts law allowed for the transfer of prisoners from
one prison facility to another, and these transfers were entirely discretionary
under the law. Therefore, a liberty interest was not created to require that
inmates be protected, under the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth
Amendment, from being arbitrarily transferred to other facilities.4'
Since Wolff and Meachum, the protocol for determining whether a state
has created a constitutionally B rotected liberty interest has taken a circuitous
course. In Hewitt v. Helms, the Supreme Court established a seemingly
clear and reliable method for determining whether a liberty interest had been
created by a state. The Court agreed that liberty interests could arise from
two separate sources: either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or state law.43 Citing Meachum, the Court found that in order
for a liberty interest to arise from state law, the state law's procedural
structure must be mandatory.44  The Court, focusing on the term
"mandatory," fashioned a test for recognizing state created liberty interests
that centered on the language used in state statutes. Essentially, the test
turned on whether the state law that allegedly created the liberty interest
used language of an "unmistakably mandatory character. ' '45 The words
35. Id. at 556-57.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
39. Id. at 223-27.
40. Id at 223.
41. Id. at 226.
42. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
43. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 471-72.
45. Id. at 471.
2009
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,'must," "shall," or "will" are compulsory and are therefore recognized as
unmistakably mandatory.46
Hewitt examined whether a Pennsylvania statute created a liberty interest
for prison inmates to remain in the general population of a penal facility.
47
Following a jailhouse fight, the respondent was moved from the general
48population of the prison to administrative confinement. The respondent
argued that jail officials violated his liberty interest in remaining in the
general population. 49 The Court determined that although the Fourteenth
Amendment did not recognize such a liberty interest, Pennsylvania had
created one statutorily. 50 Pennsylvania law allowed for inmates to be moved
into administrative confinement, but the law required certain procedures to
be followed in order to effectuate such a move. By stating that prisoners
"shall" be notified if they are being investigated for misbehavior, as well as
stating that the investigation "shall" begin immediately, the Court found that
the Pennsylvania law was sufficiently mandatory in nature and therefore
created a protected liberty interest.
52
Fifteen years after Hewitt, the Court curtailed its "mandatory language"
test somewhat in Sandin v. Conner.53  Due to the great emphasis being
placed on the phraseology of the state statutes, the Court became concerned
that courts were concluding too readily that states had created liberty
interests.54 As a result, the Court found that while states may create
protected liberty interests, the circumstances under which such interests are
created are generally limited to freedom from restraint. 55 In effect, the Court
held that the test for determining whether a state has created a protected
liberty interest is found in the cases of Wolff and Meachum.56 Under Sandin,
46. Id.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 462-64.
49. Id. at 462.
50. Id. at 467.
51. Id. at471 n.6.
52. Id. at 477. It is important to note that while the Court found Pennsylvania had
created a liberty interest, it ultimately determined that the procedures sufficiently
protected that interest.
53. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
54. Id. As a result of the mandatory language test, the Court found that prisoners
were combing state statutes that used the magic words of "shall," "will," or "must" and
that lower courts were finding too many state created liberty interests where they really
did not exist, based purely on the language used and not on the substance. Id.
55. Id. at 484.
56. See Christie v. Barrington, No. 94-1653, 1995 WL 417615, at *3 (7th Cir. Jul.
13, 1995). In determining whether a state has created a liberty interest that must be given
the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Sandin
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it is no longer sufficient that state law contain mandatory language, but such
language may still be regarded as a prerequisite to finding a state created
liberty interest.57 As a result, it is important to note that many of the Court's
post-Hewitt and pre-Sandin decisions have remained undisturbed.
Before the Supreme Court officially assumed that all competent persons. .. .. 58
have a fundamental liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, the Court
dealt with a line of cases involving the right of mentally ill patients to refuse
antipsychotic medication. The first case was Mills v. Rogers.59 The issue in
Mills was whether involuntarily committed mental patients possess a
constitutional right to refuse the administration of antipsychotic
medication. Several mental patients brought the case as a class action
against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 6 1 By the time the case was
eligible for consideration, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts had issued a ruling that the Court determined would affect the
outcome of the Mills case, thereby causing the Court to remand the Mills
case. 6 2 In issuing the remand order, the Court noted that while it would not
decide whether the involuntarily committed mental patients had a protected
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, Massachusetts' law may
recognize greater liberty interests than those found in the Constitution.
63
Therefore, a remand was ordered so that the extent of Massachusetts' newly
created liberty interest could be determined.64
The relevant decision was In the Matter of Guardianship of Roe, 6 5 decided
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Unlike the respondents in
Mills, Roe was not institutionalized, but the issue did involve Roe's right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the common law of Massachusetts, as well as the Constitution,
created a protected liberty interest in refusing the administration of
66antipsychotic drugs. The court noted that Massachusetts mandated that a
found that courts must determine if a state has "created an interest of real substance" (like
the good time credit in Wofi) as opposed to determining whether a liberty interest has
been created by conducting a rote analysis of whether a state statute used "mandatory
language." See id
57. Id.
58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
59. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
60. Id. at 298.
61. Id. at 294.
62. Id. at 300-03.
63. Id. at 300.
64. Id. at 303.
65. In the Matter of Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981).
66. Id. at 42.
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person is presumed competent, unless deemed otherwise.67 Furthermore,
even when a person has been adjudged incompetent, his right to refuse
antipsychotic medication stands.68 Incompetent persons are entitled to have
a judicial determination of substituted judgment whereby the incompetent
person's subjective preferences are determined. 69  The decision was,
70however, limited to patients who were not institutionalized.
When Rogers v. Mills was remanded, the task of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals was to determine Rogers's rights in light of Roe.71 The First Circuit
reaffirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause affords
procedural protections to state created liberty interests. 72 However, in order
to determine fully which substantive rights are afforded to involuntarily
committed mental patients under state law, the First Circuit certified a
number of questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.73 The
Supreme Judicial Court recognized several factors that effectively create
"objective expectations" through which involuntarily committed mental
patients may be given antipsychotic medications against their will.74 Most
important to this analysis is the fact that mental patients have an objective
expectation that their involuntary commitment does not rise to the level of a
determination of their incompetency to make treatment decisions.
75
Pursuant to this objective expectation, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts determined that the state had created procedural expectations
that an incompetency determination must be made by a judge at law, and no
76one else. Further, these patients have an objective expectation that, if
declared incompetent, they are entitled to a substituted judgment treatment
decision,77 as well as a state created procedural expectation that only a judge
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1II. THE RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED COMPETENT
A. Common Law and Statutory Rights Presuming Competency
As a preliminary matter, the distinction between the terms "competency"
and "capacity" must be fleshed out. The concept of "competency" is one
developed by and belonging solely to the study of law, and must be
demarcated from the notion of "capacity. ' 79 "Capacity" is a term used by
mental health professionals to assess a patient's level of competence. 80 That
is to say, while courts are the arbiters of whether one is competent, it is the
job of the clinicians to inform the court's decision by establishing one's
capacity. 81 A person may have many levels of capacity, but one either is, or82
is not, legally competent. The law presumes competency, and the burden
of proving incapacity is on the party challenging one's competence.
83
Nonetheless, the terms are often used interchangeably.
The law requires that individuals be competent to enjoy many legal rights.
For example, one must be competent to execute wills, engage in sexual
intercourse, enter into contracts, make health care decisions, and to stand
trial. In the context of criminal law, the Supreme Court has held that a state
statute creating a presumption that defendants are competent to stand trial is
not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
84
Under the Constitution, it is acceptable that the defendant have the burden of
proving incompetency. 85 With regard to entering into a contract or giving a
gift, all persons are presumed to be competent, and the burden is on the party
that wishes to attack another party's competency to prove incompetency.
8 6
At the same time that the law presumes competency, it does not presume
incompetency. 87 Further, the presumption of competency is not rebutted
simply because a person may have lost competence at some point. 88 The
presumption remains intact because a period of incompetence does not
necessitate the conclusion that a person will remain incompetent.89 Even
79. Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Applebaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions,
48 RUTGERS L. REv. 345, 348 (1996).
80. Id. at 348-49.
81. Id. at 349.
82. Id.
83. Goewey v. United States, 612 F.2d 539, 544 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
84. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
85. Id. at 452-53.
86. Wheeless v. Gelzer, 780 F. Supp. 1373, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
87. Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
88. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 181 S.E.2d 914, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
89. Golleher v. Horton, 715 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
2009
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further, the presumption remains intact even when a party is proven to have
been involuntarily committed some years prior to exercising a legal right.
90
All competent adults should have the ability to make decisions concerning
their future mental health care. 91 Stated differently, one must be competent
to execute a valid Psychiatric Advance Directive.92 As the case law has
developed, it has become clear that one's competence to make such
93decisions must be presumed. Not even in the face of psychiatric illness or
psychiatric commitment can this presumption be fully rebutted.94 Short of a
court order to the contrary, one's ability to make his or her own health care
decisions will remain intact. 95  For instance, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts affords one the presumption of competency to refuse
antipsychotic medication unless a court orders him or her incompetent to
make the decision to refuse.96
The presumption of competency is so strong that many states codify it in
particular contexts. For instance, Alaska provides that even when a person
has become incapacitated to such an extent that a guardian has been
appointed for him or her, that person nevertheless retains all legal rights that
have not been stripped away by a court order; moreover, that person is
otherwise presumed competent.97  Under California law, a person's
presumption of competency should remain unaffected, and he or she should
not be presumed incompetent solely due to evaluation or treatment for a
mental disorder, regardless of whether that treatment or evaluation was
voluntary or involuntary. 98  Louisiana, in its enumeration of the rights
guaranteed to the mentally ill, provides that patients in mental health
90. Sobberri v. Cookston, 438 So.2d 688 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (applying a state
statute mandating that there is to be no presumption of incompetence regardless of
whether a person has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to a mental health
institution).
91. Thomas S. Sasz, The Psychiatric Will: A New Mechanism for Protecting Persons
Against "Psychosis" and Psychiatry, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 762, 766 (1982).
92. Debra S. Srebnik & John Q. La Fond, Advance Directives for Mental Health
Treatment, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 919,923 (1999).
93. Gallagher, supra note I1, at 766.
94. See id "The courts have made clear that neither the fact of psychiatric illness
itself, nor the fact of commitment for psychiatric treatment, is tantamount to a
determination of incompetence to make treatment decisions." Id.
95. See id. It would take more than a court order finding a patient's incapacity and
the appointment of a guardian to overcome the presumption of competency such that a
person may be deprived of their ability to make their own health care decision. See id.
96. Jeffrey L. Geller, The Use of Advance Directives by Persons with Serious Mental
Illnessfor Psychiatric Treatment, PSYCHIATRIC Q., Spring 2000, at 1, 4.
97. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.090 (2007).
98. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5331 (West 1998).
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facilities are not presumed incompetent. 99 Furthermore, that right remains
even when a patient is involuntarily committed to the mental health
facility. 00 Only a court can determine that a person is incompetent.' 0'
Illinois has a similar statute. 0 2 Texas further provides that the presumption
of competency is a basic right afforded to persons with mental retardation.
0 3
B. PAD Statutes and the Presumption of Competency
Spurred by Congress' enactment of the Patient Self-Determination Act,
10 4
each state has enacted a statute allowing for the execution of an advance
directive. 0 5 Many states have adopted The Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act, 106 which affords the ability to make decisions concerning the treatment
of future mental health issues by allowing for mental health directives to be
incorporated into general advance medical directives. The statute provides
that "an individual is presumed to have capacity to make a health-care
decision, to give or revoke an advance directive, and to designate or
disqualify a surrogate."' 0 7 Other states, however, have enacted separate
statutes allowing for the execution of a specific Psychiatric Advance
Directive.
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted separate
statutes authorizing the execution of PADs.' °8 These states can be divided
into five categories based on the level of competency required for a patient
to execute a PAD.1°9 Three states create a presumption of competency." 0
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171(B) (2001).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2007).
103. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 592.021 (Vernon 2003).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a(1994).
105. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, supra note 4, at Prefatory Note.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 11(b).
108. See e.g. statutes cited infra notes 110-19. This number was gleaned from the
sum of the states listed in the five categories based on the level of competency required
for a patient to execute a PAD.
109. See Debra S. Srebnik & Scott Y. Kim, Competency for Creation, Use, and
Revocation of Psychiatric Advance Directives, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 501, 503
(2006). The individual state statutes falling within the categories designated by Srebnik
have been supplemented and updated through the author's own independent survey of the
current posture of PAD statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. See
statutes cited infra notes 110-19.
2009
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For example, Hawaii's PAD statute provides that "a principal is presumed to
have capacity to make mental health care decisions and to execute or revoke
an advance mental health care directive . . . ." ,II Seven other states require
that witnesses to the execution of a PAD attest that the patient is of "sound
mind;"'"12 four states require that witnesses attest that the patient is
"competent;" 13 eight states require that the patient either have "capacity" or
be "not incapacitated."' 14  Lastly, two states require that a patient either
submit to a "mental status exam,"" 5 or have a psychiatrist attest to his or her
capacity to execute a PAD." 6 There is cause for concern with regard to the
position taken by these latter two states.
1. Louisiana's PAD Statute
Louisiana's PAD statute phrases its competency requirements for
execution in negative terms. The Louisiana Advance Directives for Mental
Health Treatment statute provides that "an adult who is not incapable" may
execute a PAD.1 7 This provision, taken alone, is similar to provisions found
in PAD statutes from other states. 18 However, the Louisiana statute goes
110. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327F-1 to 327F-16 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
202A.420 to 202A.991 (LexisNexis 2007); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.32.010 to 71.32.901
(2008).
111. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327G-7 (1993).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2006); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.06 (2001); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 43/1 to 43/75 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-105 (West 2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122C-71 to 122C-77 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.700 to 127.735 and
127.995 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-16-1 to 27A-16-18 (2004).
113. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-601 to 66-613 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §
5-802(i) (Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 3831, 3862 (2004); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-602.1 (West Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT. 253B.03 (2006).
114. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3281 to 36-3287 (2003 & Supp. 2008); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-21-153 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN §§ 1337.11, 1337.14, 2135.01 to
2135.14 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 11-101 to 11-113 (2001); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5822 (2005); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 137.001 to 137.011
(Vemon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-1001 to 62A-15-1004 (2006); WVO. STAT.
ANN §§ 35-22-301 to 35-22-308 (2007).
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:221 to 28:237 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
116. IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-2 (2004).
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:222(a) (2001 & Supp. 2008).
118. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3281 to 36-3287 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §
53-21-153 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11, 1337.14, 2135.01 to 2135.14
(LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 11-101 to 11-113 (2001); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5822 (2005); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 137.001 to 137.011 (Vernon
2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-1001 to 62A-15-1004 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN §§
35-22-301 to 35-22-308 (2007).
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further to require that the PAD be "accompanied by a written mental status
examination performed by a physician or psychologist attesting to the
principal's ability to make reasoned decisions concerning his mental health
treatment."1 19 The statute also outlines the specific criteria by which the
attesting physician or psychologist should base his or her determination.
The criteria to be considered are:
(1) whether the principal demonstrates an awareness of the
nature of his illness and situation;
(2) whether the principal demonstrates an understanding of
treatment and the risks, benefits, and alternatives; and
(3) whether the principal communicates a clear choice
regarding treatment that is a reasoned one, even though it
may not be in the person's best interest.
120
These outlined requirements are remarkably similar to those that must be
met to show adequate testamentary capacity under Louisiana law.121 As is
the case in most states, a testator in Louisiana has the requisite capacity to
execute a will if it is found that the testator could have fully understood the
nature of the testamentary act and appreciate its effects. 122 Furthermore, it
has recently been reaffirmed that testamentary capacity is presumed in
Louisiana. 123 Oddly, the Louisiana PAD statute does not afford a living
person the same presumption of competency as it does the deceased. In
effect, the Louisiana PAD statute requires a person who wishes to execute a
PAD to prove his or her competence by requiring a physician to attest to it.
This seems to countervail other more deeply rooted principles of Louisiana
law.
Notably, not only does Louisiana presume the competence of decedent
testators,' 24 the state has also statutorily created the strong presumption that
periods of commitment to a mental health facility cannot override the
general presumption of competency. 25 Further, Louisiana has mandated
119. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:224 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
120. Id.
121. See e.g. Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055 (1880).
122. See Id.
123. In re Succession of Fisher, 970 So.2d 1048, 1054 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
124. Id.
125. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:171(B) (2001 & Supp. 2008). "No patient in a
treatment facility shall be presumed incompetent, nor shall such person be held
incompetent except as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. (2001 &
Supp. 2008); see also Sobberri v. Cookston, 438 So.2d 688, 690 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that a person's capacity to enter into contracts is unaffected by a commitment to
a treatment facility for mental illness since such a commitment does not create a
presumption of incompetency under the above referenced statute).
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that a person can only be found incompetent through a judicial
determination.126
2. Indiana's PAD Statute
Concerning the execution of a PAD, Indiana's statute is very similar to
Louisiana's. Indiana's statute provides that any person with capacity may
execute a PAD, 127 but the statute also requires "the psychiatrist treating the
individual" to attest to:
(A) the appropriateness of the individual's preferences stated
in the psychiatric advance directive; and
(B) the capacity of the individual entering into the psychiatric
advance directive.
128
The plain language of this statute unabashedly presupposes that those who
wish to execute a PAD are currently psychiatric patients. This is evident
from the requirement that a treating psychiatrist attest to the ability of the
person executing the PAD. 129 Even Louisiana's statute is more broadly
drawn.
130
Like Louisiana law and that of nearly every state, Indiana's case law
recognizes that all persons are presumed to have the capacity to execute a
last will and testament.' 31 To do so, a person need only have the capacity to
understand the nature and the effects of executing a will.132 Indiana has
statutorily extended this presumption that individuals have the capacity to
execute a will by incorporating the presumption of capacity into the rights of
patients being treated for mental illness. In other words, unless a person
has been adjudicated incompetent, he or she is entitled to enjoy all of the
rights naturally afforded to all persons under the law.
134
126. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171(B) (2001 & Supp. 2008).
127. IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-2 (a) (2004).
128. IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-2 (b)(7)(A) and (B)(2004).
129. It is probably fair to say that one does not have a "treating physician" if they are
not already a current patient.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:224 (2001 and Supp. 2008). The Louisiana statute
arguably makes no presupposition that persons seeking to execute a PAD are currently
being treated by a psychiatrist since the statute requires all persons executing a PAD to
submit to a mental status exam.
131. Gast v. Hall, 858 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
132. Id.
133. See IND. CODE § 12-27-2-3(a) (2004).
134. Id. "A patient is entitled to exercise the patient's constitutional, statutory, and
civil rights except for those rights that have been denied or limited by an adjudication or
finding of mental incompetency in a guardianship or other civil proceeding." Id.
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Historically, both Louisiana and Indiana law have recognized that all
persons are presumed competent. Consequently, the citizens of these two
states have a justifiable expectation that should their competency be called
into question, the courts will make that determination. Arguably, this
interest rises to the level of being a liberty interest worthy of constitutional
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If
so, the explicit language of the Louisiana and Indiana PAD statutes
abrogates a protected liberty interest by not providing due process of law.
By mandating a physician to administer a mental status examination, or by
requiring that a treating psychiatrist attest to the competency of a patient
who desires to execute a PAD, Louisiana and Indiana allow physicians to do
something they themselves are ironically incompetent to do: determine
competency. 13 Competency is a legal standard, 137 and the law of both states
requires a judge to make this determination. Nonetheless, this right must be
balanced against the interests of the state.
138
C. State Interests Concerning the Presumption of Competency with Respect
to PAD Execution
Those who advocate the use of PADs argue that the presumption of
competency should not be abandoned simply because a person is mentally
ill. These advocates note that many circumstances, including myriad
physical illnesses, may affect the cognitive capacity of an individual in
135. Louisiana law states that not even patients in treatment facilities can be presumed
incompetent and that it is the sole province of the courts to determine whether such a
patient is incompetent. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171(B) (2001). Indiana law also
essentially provides a presumption of competency to patients being treated for a mental
illness by stating that such patients have a right "to exercise [their] constitutional,
statutory, and civil rights" to the extent that the ability to exercise those rights has not
been taken away from them by an "adjudication or finding of mental incompetency."
IND. CODE § 12-27-2-3(a) (2004).
136. See supra notes 79-83. Psychiatrists, as medical doctors, are only competent to
assess a patient's capacity, not a patient's competency. Competency is a legal standard
that remains within the sole province of the courts. See id.
137. See Berg, Applebaum & Grisso, supra note 79.
138. See e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 223 (1990) (holding that where a
mentally ill prisoner is a threat to his own safety and the safety of others, treatment
against the prisoner's will is not a violation of the prisoner's substantive due process
rights).
139. Debra Srebnik & Lisa Brodoff, Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives:
Service Provider Issues and Answers, 30 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERV. & REs. 253 (2003).
The presumption of competency is afforded equally to persons seeking to execute general
health care directives, and one's competency should not be questioned simply because
they seek to execute a PAD. See id. at 257.
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similar ways as mental illness, but the competency of the physically ill is not
questioned.
140
One of the major concerns voiced by some mental health care providers is
that mentally ill persons may not be competent to execute a PAD. 141 There
is a concern that the practical effect of presuming competency is to make it
nearly impossible to rebut this presumption. That is, it may be difficult to
later corroborate the patient's level of competency at the time the PAD was
executed. 142 The inference here is that mental health care providers may not
be willing to follow a patient's PAD during a mental health crisis if they do
not have faith that the patient was actually competent when it was executed.
143 Consequently, there is strong support for requiring specific competency
requirements for patients wishing to execute PADs.
Nonetheless, there is some agreement over what the definition of
competency should entail. The level of competence required to execute a
PAD "appear[s] to require at least the ability to understand and appreciate
the risks and benefits of various therapeutic alternatives as well as the ability
to engage in the process of rational deliberation. ' 44  In other words, a
patient must be able to fully comprehend that he or she is making present
choices regarding preferred psychiatric care during future times of
incapacity. 1&5 However, this is likely a manifestation of the confusion over
the difference between capacity and competency. 146
In one of the earliest arguments advocating for the use of binding advance
directives in the context of mental illness, competency was presupposed.
1 47
Where a patient demonstrates intermittent levels of lucidity, based on the
cyclical nature of his or her mental illness, advocates assert that statements
140. Id. at 257. For example, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, and dementia all alter one's
cognitive capacity.
141. Id. at 256-57.
142. Srebnik & La Fond, supra note 92, at 921.
143. See Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 139, at 257.
144. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 777. Furthermore, a patient must be able to
understand the consequences of executing a PAD on their future treatment during a time
of incapacity. Id.
145. Patricia Backlar, Ethics in Community Mental Health Care: Anticipatory
Planning for Psychiatric Treatment is Not Quite the Same as Planning for End-of-Life
Care, 33 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 261, 265 (1997).
146. See supra Section II1. A.
147. Morton E. Winston & Sally M. Winston, Case Studies: Can a Subject Consent to
a "Ulysses Contract"? Commentary, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Aug. 1982, at 26,
27. This article refers to binding advance directives known as "Ulyssess Contracts,"
harkening back to the story of Ulysses and his battle of temptation caused by the song of
the Sirens.
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made during these periods of lucidity best express a patient's wishes.' 48 The
fact that a patient suffers from a mental illness should bear no influence on
his or her level of competency during times of lucidity. The fact that a
person suffering from mental illness should be considered legally competent
during periods of lucidity is bolstered by a case study which was performed
in 1982.149 There, the patient consented to experimental treatment during a
period of lucidity, but later refused the experimental treatment once he came
off of his antipsychotic medications, thereby causing his mental stability to
deteriorate and effectively render him incompetent. Once the patient was
given his medications and he regained his lucidity, the patient was
disappointed to learn that the experimental treatment had not been
administered, and he manifested a strong desire to follow through with the
experimental treatment again.
51
Mental health professionals tend to determine a patient's level of
competency by focusing on the severity of a patient's mental illness.
However, it has been shown that one's cognitive ability may be a better
indicator.' 52  The competency level of psychiatric patients has been
demonstrated to be statistically indistinguishable from the competency level
of normal medical patients.1 53  Across the board, mentally ill patients
demonstrated a similar ability to both comprehend information required to
obtain informed consent and make rational choices regarding their medical
treatment.' 54 Further, even those patients exhibiting the most chronic levels
of mental illness were able to comprehend information and make rational
decisions.'
55
By most measures of incompetency, there is no doubt that many mentally
ill and chronically mentally ill persons are competent. 156  Mentally ill
persons are not per se incompetent, in the same way that mentally healthy
persons are not per se competent.' 57 Just as certain physical illnesses may
render a mentally healthy person incompetent, 158 the competency level of




151. Id. at 16.
152. Barbara Stanley & Michael Stanley, What is it? How is it Assessed? Testing
Competency in Psychiatric Patients, IRB: ETHICS AND HUMAN RESEARCH 1, 3 (1982).
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id.
155. Id. at3.
156. Elyn R. Saks & Dilip V. Jeste, Capacity to Consent to or Refuse Treatment
and/or Research: Theoretical Considerations, 24 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 411, 426 (2006).
157. Id.
158. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 139.
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personal fantasies, and the overvaluation of memories or irrational decision-
making. 159
Another study that examined the ability of mentally ill patients to
comprehend informed consent disclosures concluded that schizophrenic
patients are more likely to demonstrate lower levels of understanding of
treatment disclosures than are normal medically ill patients., This study
tested mentally ill patients that were hospitalized in an acute psychiatric care
unit.1 61  Therefore, this study likely makes no statement as to the
competency of mentally ill patients during periods of lucidity. Notably, the
authors of the study stated that the results of this study should not be used to
make conclusions concerning the relative legal competencies of mentally ill
and medically ill patients. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to
support the proposition that a mentally ill patient's level of competency to
consent to treatment shifts as his or her condition improves through
treatment. 163
IV. CONCLUSION
It is fairly well settled that all competent persons have the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, even if such treatment would be lifesaving. As
a result, individuals have the right to execute instructions memorializing
their present intentions concerning future medical treatment during times of
incapacity. Every jurisdiction in this country has established laws allowing
these types of decisions in the form of general advance medical directives.
Roughly half of all U.S. jurisdictions have enacted separate statutes, in the
form of PADs, that allow for the execution of similar directives concerning
future psychiatric treatment during times of incompetency. The law
generally presumes that all persons are competent, regardless of whether or
not they have had prior periods of incompetency or are currently committed
to mental health institutions. The presumption of competency is firmly
rooted in the laws of our states, and many states have enacted statutes
memorializing this right.
Moreover, only courts of law may adjudge one as incompetent. The right
to be presumed competent is so prevalent in all areas of the law that it
159. Saks & Jeste, supra note 156, at 426.
160. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Applebaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally-Ill
Patient's Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for Medication:
Preliminary Data, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 377, 386 (1991).
161. Id. at 379.
162. Id. at 387.
163. Harold I. Schwartz & Karen Blank, Shifting Competency During
Hospitalization: A Model for Informed Consent Decisions 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1256, 1256 (1986).
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arguably rises to the level of a liberty interest created by both the statutory
and common law of the states. The procedural requirement entrusting
judges as arbiters of the determination of incompetency provides sufficient
protection under the Due Process Clause. Most states that have enacted
PAD statutes recognize the right to be presumed competent to execute a
PAD, either explicitly or through lenient execution requirements. The PAD
statutes in Indiana and Louisiana, however, differ in that they respectively
require either a mental status examination, or the attestation of a treating
psychiatrist to ensure that a person or patient is competent to execute a PAD.
These requirements violate the expectation of persons in those states to be
presumed competent, and remove the judiciary's right to determine
competency. As such, the Louisiana and Indiana statutes violate the liberty
interests created by the tradition of the common law in those states, as well
as other Louisiana and Indiana statutes specifically affording all persons the
right to be presumed competent. Moving forward, all states that have not yet
enacted PAD statutes should seek to emulate those states that have provided
for a presumption of competence directly in their PAD statutes. Doing so
will ensure that all individuals, regardless of their propensity for mental
illness, are afforded the fundamental liberty interest of making decisions
regarding future health care treatment.
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